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Accountability for
System Criminality
Mark A. Drumbl*

Andrd Nollkaemper argues that individual criminal culpability fails to reflect
the structural nature of mass atrocity.' He encourages attempts by international
criminal law to recognize collective action, for example through vicarious modes
of liability, but ultimately notes that even expansive liability doctrines yield only a
partial print of justice. Hence, international criminal law experiences an agency
gap. Nollkaemper then argues that state responsibility, and other forms of
collective responsibility, may better capture system criminality and related crimes
of obedience. 2 That said, whereas international criminal law suffers from an
agency gap, collective forms of responsibility suffer from an institutional gap. At
present, there is no effective way to actually enforce collective responsibility, in
particular beyond the state as juridical subject. Nollkaemper encourages the United
Nations Security Council to step into the breach.3 Ultimately, he posits that the
relationship between individual criminal culpability and collective civil
responsibility should become more synergistic. 4
I agree with nearly all of Nollkaemper's assumptions, conclusions, and
arguments. International criminal law conceptually situates itself upon a fiction,
namely that wide-scale atrocity is the crime of individuals. 5 Such it may be, but it
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Id. at 347-52.
Id. at 352.
This paradigm effectively emerged at Nuremberg, where the International Military Tribunal
(IMT) intoned that the crimes in question were not the crimes of abstract entities, but the
crimes of men and, what is more, that "only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced." I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223 (Nuremberg, 1947)
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also is much more. The sum is larger than the parts. Atrocity is the product of
groups, of acquiescent bystanders, of collective action, of colonial histories, of
blood diamonds and coltran, and of the passivity of powerful foreign governments
and international organizations. 6 Yet the criminal law pins blame only on those few
who are most evidently, most notoriously, or most immediately responsible.
International criminal law thereby offers a simple, reductionist lens that flattens the
complex etiology of atrocity. This flattened approach may soothe our sensibilities.
It may assuage our fears. It does not embarrass too much or too many.
Nevertheless, it remains a fiction.
Alternately, the collective and systemic nature of atrocity might push us beyond
the criminal law to consider what collective and systemic forms of justice would
look like. In Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, I argued that
international criminal law would benefit from a horizontal expansion that
welcomes other forms of law and regulation so that post-conflict justice can
become much more than merely criminal prosecutions and sequestered
incarceration. 7 Justice should implicate much more than the courtroom and the
jailhouse, both of which currently benefit from iconic status as the reflexive (or, in
8
Nollkaemper's words, "dominant") accountability response to mass atrocity.
To varying degrees, wide-scale atrocity is a collective project nearly
everywhere that it occurs. 9 Most particularly in cases of genocide and those crimes

6.

(emphasis added). The IMT judges initially meant to respond to defendants' claims that
they bore no responsibility for crimes committed by the Nazi state. In other words, the IMT
underscored that these crimes were those of individuals in an attempt to avoid the situation
where the responsibility of an abstract collective precludes the identification of individual
guilt. That said, in the many years since Nuremberg, this sentence has come to stand for a
much more independent proposition, namely that it is only by prosecuting individuals that
justice can be served, thereby obscuring the responsibility of collectives. In my opinion, the
challenge is to view both individual and collective responsibility as mutually
complementary to the justice narrative, not mutually exclusive such that the instantiation of
the former comes at the cost of the suborning of the latter.
Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 320 (stating that "[p]erhaps the most important mechanism
by which collectivities contribute to international crimes is through their influence on the
normative climate").
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MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
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Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 313.
See, e.g., Steve Heder, Reassessing The Role of Senior Leaders and Local Officials in
Democratic Kampuchea Crimes: Cambodian Accountability In Comparative Perspective,
in BRINGING THE KHMER ROUGE TO JUSTICE: PROSECUTING MASS VIOLENCE BEFORE THE

CAMBODIAN COURTS 377 (Ramji and Van Schaack eds., 2005) (discussing Cambodia); See
also DRUMBL, supra note 7, ch. 2 (discussing Rwanda, Nazi Germany, Serbia, and TimorLeste).
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against humanity that are motivated by discriminatory animus, individual killers
are not really deviant. Nor are they transgressive, delinquent, or pathological.
Rather, these killers may simply be conforming to social norms that dominate in
the place and time where they undertake their work-they may well believe
themselves engaged in purifying their spaces of the 'other,' of 'taking out the
garbage,' of 'expunging the vermin,' of 'trimming the tall trees,' and of 'pulling
out the bad weeds.' Theirs is often a terrible but normalized social project, a
bureaucratic enterprise, a day of service to the collective.
Accordingly, I believe international criminal justice needs to engage actively
with collective responsibility and, in this vein, I applaud Nollkaemper's work. My
sense is that in recent years collective responsibility-despite the admonitions of
some that it is primitive or primeval' 0 -seems to have made a small yet perceptible
renaissance in the dialogic space of international criminal justice.
In the paper, Nollkaemper focuses his discussion on the international level. At
this level, he locates institutional gaps in the enforcement of collective
responsibility.11
I will leave for another day an assessment of Nollkaemper's encouraging of the
United Nations Security Council to play a more involved role in the institutional
enforcement of collective responsibility. Obvious critiques to Nollkaemper's
proposition are: (1) that the Security Council will be paralyzed by politics; (2) that
empowering the Security Council to pursue justice along collective lines may
come at the price of its shying away from the International Criminal Court (e.g. by
not referring situations or by deferring referrals under article 16 of the Rome
Statute)12 ; and (3) that the Security Council may not be able to proceed in a
principled, predictable, or consistent manner-these characteristics generally being
regarded as central to the legitimacy of any accountability enterprise.
I propose moving the conversation off the international plane. International
institutions are not the only show in town. After all, the bulk of the accountability
business occurs at the national level. National institutions could robustly instantiate
institutional and methodological diversity in the accountability narrative.
International criminal lawyers might therefore carefully consider outreach to
collective forms of responsibility within the context of national and local
institutions.

10.

Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 323.

11.

at 344-45.
See id.

12.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 16, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 91.
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A variety of national initiatives already contemplate what could be described as
collective forms of responsibility. Some of these are juridical in nature. Examples
include the Alien Tort Claims Act in the United States, which permits civil
damages in tort for violations of the laws of nations.1 3 Claims have gone forward,
amid considerable controversy, against corporations (a collective actor that, at
present, is not a formal subject of international law). 14 The Anvil Mining
Company, an Australian-Canadian corporation, has been the subject of
investigation in Australia for alleged involvement in serious human rights abuses
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Lawsuits brought in U.S. courts by
Holocaust survivors and other victims of atrocity in World War II have prompted
Germany, along with other states and other collective entities such as banks and
insurance companies, to undertake massive restitutionary settlements.' 5 In total,
Michael Bazyler estimates these settlements as involving $ US 8 billion., 6 Even
museums have restituted art found in their collections that had been stolen by the
Nazis. Moreover, it is entirely plausible that national juridical organs could ascribe
group liability to militias, organizations, non-state actors, rebel groups, ministries,
departments, and corporations. Traditional forms of dispute resolution, for example
in the African context, may serve reintegrative functions for groups of offenders,
7
such as child soldiers.'
What is more, collective manifestations of responsibility need not only be
articulated in judicial or quasi-judicial settings. Truth commissions can locate and
ascribe collective and system responsibility. Public inquiries can expose the
conduct of organizations in times of atrocity without even needing to identify
culpable individuals. Nollkaemper laments the lack of accountability for detainee
abuses occurring under the watch of the Bush Administration.' 8 A truth
commission or public inquiry, which is currently under somewhat anemic public
discussion in the United States, could uproot the sources of the abuses in a manner
that transcends the military courts-marshal that have thus far clumsily targeted

13.
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Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).

15.

See HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION, PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 103
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(Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006).
Id.
The International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over children (which it defines as
persons below the age of 18 at the time of the alleged wrongdoing). See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, supra note 12, art. 26.
See Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 317, 319 (owing to the system criminality of the

conduct).
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only lower-level offenders.19 Other forms of justice, including memorialization,
lustration, commemoration, and reparations also can proceed at the level of
collectivities, thereby closing the accountability gap. As David Gray argues,
perhaps states ought to reconsider categorically forgiving odious debt that weighs
down successor regimes insofar as such forgiveness might compromise
that relate to both recipient states as
"transitional imperatives of truth and justice"
20
well as transnational corporate investors.
Moreover, thought should be given to how the architecture of international
criminal law might stimulate methodological diversity at the national and local
levels. As I have argued elsewhere, it is my belief that at present the institutions of
international criminal law, predicated on primacy or complementarity, encourage
mimicry among national justice initiatives, instead of diversity, thereby simply
dissuading experimentation at the national level with mechanisms that diverge
from the predicate of atomized individual conduct that underpins the Nuremberg
paradigm and which Nollkaemper laments as offering only a distorted picture of
justice. El
In sum, the institutional gap potentially could be filled by national or local
institutions.
Nollkaemper does not examine why, exactly, individual criminal culpability has
achieved iconic status. One narrative of international criminal law is that the field
has emerged through the heroic efforts of committed lawyers and activists who
have pushed back against powerful and embedded state interests. Certainly, there
is some truth to this narrative. However, the overall etymology of the field is far
more nuanced. International criminal law, which has benefitted from a flurry of
institution-building, would not exist but for the support of states. Collective entities
such as states, international organizations, non-state actors, groups, and
corporations may benefit from the crimped narratives that international criminal
law produces. International criminal law makes it possible for states, and
populations, to point their fingers at a handful of notorious offenders and leaders
and say, "Aha! It's your fault that mass atrocity occurred." And then to add:
"That's it-when you are prosecuted, and punished, we move on, close up shop,
and thereby attain closure. Justice has been served."
19.
20.

See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Truth or Consequences?, SLATE, Nov. 26, 2008,
http://www.slate.cor/id2205566/.
David C. Gray, Devilry, Complicity, and Greed: TransitionalJustice and Odious Debt, 70
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

21.

137, 137 (2007).

DRUMBL, supra note 7, ch.5.
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The ICC encourages self-referrals in which illiberal governments may
consolidate their own power by externalizing terrible violence by rebel groups
upon the ICC which thereby becomes hamstrung in its ability to investigate human
rights abuses by the referring governments. In this sense, the ICC can become coopted by states. Uganda has neatly managed the ICC to (justifiably) discredit the
LRA rebels while (unjustifiably) cloaking its own practices in Acholiland.
Moreover, the risk of co-optation, which arises from the dependence of
international criminal tribunals on the cooperation of concerned states, is not
limited to the ICC. Rwanda has effectively managed the ICTR such that its judicial
22
narrative is limited only to the genocidal abuses of the former Hutu government.
The truths emerging from the atrocity trial are largely convenient truths. They
do not create structural disquiet. The rules of evidence admit only that which
implicates the individual defendant. Consequently, the viability of collective
responsibility frameworks necessarily involves dissipating, overcoming, or
wrestling the fears of states as to the narratives that will result. The viability of
collective responsibility schemes also depends on candidly assessing the argument
that preserving the humanity of aggressor collectivities by denying collective
responsibility is a pivotal element in facilitating transitions toward peace.
Sometimes denial serves valuable purposes.
One of Nollkaemper's suggested reforms-that the culpability mechanisms of
international criminal law expand to better welcome vicarious liability
doctrines23-is hotly debatable. Nollkaemper effectively suggests that international
criminal law should cover more kinds of conduct. However, international criminal
law is predicated on individual culpability proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Vicarious liability principles compromise this inherent assumption, thereby
injecting some incoherence into the discipline. An alternate approach would entail
cabining international criminal law and, instead, expanding collective

22.

VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: VIRTUAL
TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION (Cambridge University Press 2008).

23.

Examples might include joint criminal enterprise, command responsibility, aiding and
abetting; and also injecting greater elasticity into juridical understandings of "committing,"
"instigating," "ordering," and both "direct" and "indirect co-perpetration." See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (March
12, 2008) (expanding the legal definition of committing genocide and applying that
extended definition to crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR2001-70-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (February 27, 2009) (noting that "committing" is not
limited to direct and physical perpetration). I quibble with Nollkaemper's conclusion that
article 25 of the Rome Statute recognizes joint criminal enterprise.

Accountabilityfor System Criminality

responsibility doctrines. Despite rhetorical pronouncements of "duality" by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) with regard to the overlapping nature of state
responsibility and individual penal responsibility, 24 in practice this duality looks
much more like subaltemity. Specifically, in the overlapping jurisdiction over
genocide at Srebrenica, the work of the ICJ has become subordinated to that of the
ICTY. Goldstone and Hamilton argue that the ICJ's approach to fact-finding in the
Bosnia v. Serbia litigation, in which the ICJ was extremely dependent on findings
(and even refusals to make findings) of genocide by ICTY judges and prosecutors
in charging documents, exceeded appropriate levels of deference. I would add
that the express political gamble by Serbia to supply redacted evidence to the
ICTY (at the time to shield itself from concurrent state responsibility at the ICJ),
and its success in undertaking this gamble, demonstrate that the duality between
criminal and state responsibility operates in name only. Until the iconography of
the criminal trial as the first-best best practice for accountability in the wake of
terrible atrocity is debunked the power dynamics will not really change. The ICJ
and ICTY co-exist in some sort of duality, but one that apparently requires
bargains (as in the context of the evidence issue) that compromise the overall
justice narrative to the detriment of collective civil responsibility and in favor of
individual criminal responsibility. Furthermore, the status of transitional justice
mechanisms at the national level is circumscribed not only by the lionized status of
the atrocity trial, but also by the powerful transplant effects of primacy and
complementarity doctrines. These doctrines replicate the internationalized status of
liberal trials and correctional preferences within national jurisdictions to the
detriment, I argue, of collective assignations of responsibility.
Despite these lamentations, it will not be possible for proponents of collective
forms of responsibility to see their ideas gain traction in the absence of compelling
arguments as to why responsibility should be assigned collectively. Achieving this
traction requires much more than simply saying trials do little. After all, little is
better than nothing. Unless collective forms of accountability can do more, why
bother pursuing them? A burden of proof question arises. Nollkaemper might give
us more in this regard.

24.

25.

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.CJ. 1, 67 (Feb. 26), available at
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php? pl=3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=4.
Richard J. Goldstone & Rebecca J. Hamilton, Bosnia v. Serbia: Lessonsfrom the Encounter
of the International Court of Justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 95, 106 (2008).
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To be sure, it is difficult to give more right now. Collective responsibility
schematics have not seen much action in the fight against impunity. The ground
has been occupied by the atrocity trial. And the atrocity trial is not ready to cede its
ground, or whittle away its vaunted status. Still, proponents of collective
responsibility must think hard, at least in theory, about what collective sanctions
could bring to the justice table.
According to international criminal jurisprudence, the purposes of criminal
punishment include retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, truth-telling,
incapacitation, expressivism, and reconciliation. Among these, deterrence and
rehabilitation are mentioned most frequently. I have argued elsewhere that criminal
prosecution and incarceration go only a small way to attain these goals, which is
disappointing in light of the rhetoric of international criminal lawyers as to the
deterrent and retributive value of the international atrocity trial.26 I believe that
among all goals, trials do the best at attaining expressive values, which I identify as
simultaneously constructing the value of law and authenticating a historical
narrative.
But the question arises: would collective sanctions fare better on any of these
fronts? I believe they might. Certainly, they offer a more accurate picture of the
polycentric provenance of atrocity, of its diffuse origins, and of the role of the
many (in particular benefitting bystanders). In this sense, by implicating more
individuals in the accountability narrative, collective sanctions might better attain
overall retributive purposes. That said, collective sanctions may be inequitable
insofar as crudely collective assignations of responsibility might implicate
individuals regardless of what they actually did, how much they suffered, or how
bravely they resisted. In response, it is not inexorable that the responsible group be
designed crudely. We can consider careful and hybrid forms of drawing the group;
and even structures where individual members might rebut a presumption of
inclusion. I also have argued that collective sanctions might serve deterrent
purposes by impeding the normalization of hate among the general population, in
particular benefitting bystanders (without whom, I argue, there would be no
possibility of truly mass atrocity). At present, insofar as criminal responsibility
only reaches a handful of individuals, the general population has no incentive but
to play along as the conflict entrepreneur consolidates his power base and
normalizes the criminal state or association. If benefitting bystanders could face

26.

DRUMBL, supra note 7,

ch.6.
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liability for the crimes ultimately committed by conflict entrepreneurs and zealous
killers in their collective names, then perhaps they would have an incentive to
snuff out these actors before the society becomes habituated into killing.
Accordingly, the "breeding ground" for atrocity may diminish.27
I also argue that collective forms of responsibility carry significant expressive
and denunciatory value. Although Nollkaemper turns to Darcy's work to state that
the practice of international reparation is such that its effect on ordinary citizens is
negligible, I do not accept this conclusion.28 Tell that to the citizens of Iraq during
times of economic sanction-a clear case-study of the Security Council taking
collective responsibility measures, which obviously bears upon Nollkaemper's
recommendation for the Security Council to play a more active institutional role.
Tell that to Germans following Versailles-more than anything else, it is that
treaty which has turned collective sanction into a bMte noire. Serbia vigorously
sought to insulate itself from the ICJ litigation. Serbia was more concerned with
the prospect of a state responsibility award against it than the individual criminal
responsibility of a small subset of formerly popular leaders. The weight of an
entire society being attributed the crimes committed in its collective name is
burdensome. Whereas individual criminal punishment bestows collective
innocence on anyone not charged, collective responsibility provides no such out,
except in situations where individuals have an opportunity to rebut the
presumption of responsibility by demonstrating what, exactly, they did to resist
atrocity committed in their collective names. To this end, in designing collective
responsibility schemes proponents need to pay great attention to effect and
vocabulary. Collective responsibility is not tantamount to collective punishment or
collective guilt, both of which, it is widely argued, are prohibited by customary
international law.
In sum, up and until those concerned with the inadequacy of criminal trials can
demonstrate why collective forms of sanction add something to the justice metric,
it will be difficult to unseat the primacy of the criminal trial given its relative
practical convenience and allure in the public imagination, not to mention the pathdependency that has coalesced in its favor. To this end, calls to close the
institutional gap in favor of more rigorous enforcement of collective
responsibility-whether at the international, national, or local levels-must make a

27.
28.

Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 352.
Id. at 324.
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case why collective responsibility attains pertinent goals and avoids pernicious
harms.

